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REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The Defendants avoid rather than answer the issues presented
on appeal

by the

"Statement

of

Plaintiffs.
Issues

The Defendants

Presented

for

create their own

Review"

correspondence with Plaintiffs1. (See Brief of
and Brief

of this

succeeded

with

Court from
the

court.

premature

until

the

determined.

Issues of

remedy and

issues just as

The Defendants seek to

of remedy

are

case but

no

Appellants page 1

the principal

lower

focus the appeal on the questions
issues

ha§

of Respondents page 1). The Defendants seek to divert

the attention
they

which

and equity.

principal

legal

equity are

Those

issues

are

difficult in this

at this point they have not received even a preliminary

hearing in the

trial

court.

They

are

simply

not

ripe for

appellate review.
Despite Defendants' diversions, the central question of this
appeal is whether there was a
IMPA.

IMPA cannot

valid combination

between CVD and

focus on such a question for long since they

have no authority upon

which

they

can

rely

to

position.

talk

about

the

"few

disgruntled", the

They

"irreversible

can

entanglements"

and

"ratification

justify their

by

subsequent

mergers", but such cannot change the fact that the CVD merger was
a sham and a clear attempt to circumvent

the law.

(See

R. 66,

80-81) .
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS1 STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants'

"Statement

rescission, implying
contractual

that

relationship

of

Facts"

Plaintiffs
between

focuses on the issue of

seek

rescission

Plaintiffs

and

of some

Defendants.

2
Plaintiffs1 claim, as stated in their
for money

damages and

two entities.

only alternatively

that the

"Lettef of

be rescinded, which agreement was the standard of

between

Plaintiffs do

of Action, is

for separation of the

The Plaintiffs' do not claim

Intent" should
operation

First Cause

IMPA

and

allege that

parcel to the later

CVD

until

the

purported merger.

the Letter

of Intent is not part and

purported merger,

consolidation or transfer

of assets.
The real fact is that the Letter of Intent, although it laid
the

ground

work

participating
lawsuit.

for

a

cooperatives,

The Defendants

the Letter

future

of Intent

possible

has

this Court

was in fact the controlling document which

record

Directors of CVD.

reveals

would

was

approved

by

formal

require

combination

"further

board

of

Paragraph

states that the assets
under the

would be made available
IMPA.

Board of

eight of

of

the

membership

at that time".

the Letter of Intent clearly

various

ownership of
through

the associated

and/or

approval of the parties as may be required by law
(R. 537-538).

the

In fact, a closer look at the Letter of Intent

clearly reveals that any

would remain

(R.66).

is because Defendants know that Letter was the only

thing that the

cooperatives

the

to believe that

legitimized Defendants' claim of "a transfer of assets".
Perhaps this

of

to do with Plaintiffs1

little

would like

combination

lease

associated cooperatives

the respective parties and
or

other

mechanisms to

(R. 538).

The Defendants

allege in their "Statement of Facts" that it

3

would not be feasible to separate former CVD producers from IMPA,
that farm

pick .up routes have been adjusted to achieve economies

which are irreversible, that
has been

combined, that

entered

into

and

capital purchases

that

"detrimental reliance"

these

odd that

remedies as
will

have

facts.

No one

determine

is

Plaintiffs.

and

points

of

foreclosing on the

or could

be pulled apart.

Defendants should emphasize the difficulty of
defense.

determine
can

A court

sitting in equity

remedies after a full determination of

prejudge

best

suited

There

are

permutations from

and leases have been

Court in

IMPA should

their primary
to

the cooperatives

"entanglements"

justify the

possibility that CVD and
It seems

insurance between

what
to

correct

numerous

which the

method

a

the

trial

court will

errors

alleged by

alternatives

with unlimited

court sitting in equity can select.

Plaintiffs did not ask for rescission but for money damages first
and then

alternatively for orders placing the parties back under

the Letter of Intent.
Interestingly, the

Defendants' "Statement

of Facts" failed

to elucidate that all of the entanglements which Defendants refer
to were as a
Letter of

direct and

calculated result

of the

terms of the

Intent which on its face was clearly terminable by its

own provisions in paragraph 21 of the Letter of Intent.
The parties

(R.541).

to the Letter of Intent anticipated the potentiality

of ,a breaking apart from the

entanglements of

their association

pursuant to the provisions of the Letter of Intent.
In

the

second

to

the

last

paragraph

on

page

13

of

4
Defendants' "Statement

of

matter

"the

of

fact

that

Facts",

the

corporate

Defendants

state

entities of the four (4)

cooperatives which formed IMPA possess no members, no
liabilities or

any purpose

for existing".

alleged

combination

invalid it is void
marriage, and

ab

initio,

CVD would

CVD had no Board of

between

In

fact, if

CVD and IMPA was improper and

similar

be restored

Directors,

assetg, no

Such a statement is

clearly not fact but an erroneous legal conclusion.
the

as a

to

an

annulment

of a

to its separate assets. If

someone

forgot

to

advise them

since they held an official meeting after the alleged combination
took place on December 17, 1987.
The most
Facts"

disturbing part

involves

the

(R. 547).

of the

recitation

subsequent merger between IMPA

of

and two

Defendants' "Statement of
voting

results

from

other cooperatives.

a
In

the "Statement of Facts" the Defendants cite those voting results
and imply that such was a referendum which ratified their earlier
illegal

acts.

Any

subsequent combinations of IMPA with other

entities is irrelevant and immaterial.
possible

and

quite

probable

that

In fact,

certain

members

holders voting on the subsequent IMPA merger did
belief

that

they

were

preserving

what

IMPA.

It is

IMPA apparently learned how
agricultural cooperatives

or equity

so only

in the

equity interests they

retained by now voting to move it to an entity
stability than

it is entirely

that offered more

interesting to note, however, that

to conduct
as it

a proper

combination of

did follow in this instance the

procedures of Utah Code Section 3-1-30,

(1953 as

amended).

Had

5
IMPA followed those same procedures which were also announced for
the December 16, 1985 meeting,

this

entire

dispute

could have

been avoided.
relevant part of the Defendants1 entire "Statement

The only

of Facts" is that IMPA never followed the requirements of Section
3-1-30 et

seq. or

any other statutory requirements in combining

IMPA with CVD.

Although the Defendants claim on page

"Statement

Facts"

of

that

the

members

of

CVD "approved and

authorized the transfer", a search of the referenced
page 429

through 547

a

Utah Code

The only

merger/consolidation

Annotated.

under

The meeting

December 16,

transfer

the December 16th meeting.

within the

of

assets,

"meeting to merge".
of Gordon

entire record
let

alone

a

(Emphasis added).

Zilles, the

author of

not occur as

(R. 687-688).

CVD Board action which came close to approving
authorization of

1985 to

Section 3-1-30 et seq.,

admittedly did

advertised and the lower court so found.

no evidence

thing it

is that there was in fact an advertisement served on

some of the members of CVD of a meeting on
consider

record from

attributable to that alleged fact does not

reveal any record to support the allegation.
does reveal

9 of their

a merger

The

was its

(R. 543). There is

that CVD
plan

The only

ever approved a

of merger, but only a
unrefuted affidavits

the December 16, 1985 minutes,

further clarify the purpose of the approved "meeting".
Defendants
Plaintiffs did

claim

in

not raise

their

"Statement

of

Facts"

that

their challenge to the validity of the

combination until two and a half (2 1/2) years from

the date the

6
Letter

of

Intent

was

signed.

Plaintiffs

challenge the validity of the Letter
ot

Intent

was

transformed

meeting of

of Intent

as a

in

August

meeting

ever

of

1986.

The

considered

activities were unknown in
the Board

After

December 16, 1985, the Deed to the Amalga

resolution of the CVD Board of
No

until the Letter

autonomous cooperative.

CVD plant was transferred to IMPA without any
Board

no reason to

into an illegal combination and the

claimed eradication of CVD
the member

had

Meeting held

notice to

recitations in the Deed to a

directors is
or

entirely imaginary.

approved any such deed.

significant part

December 17,

than two (2) months later on

the CVD

to the

1986.

February

13,

These

Board until

Suit was filed less
1987.

Clearly the

Plaintiffs acted timely and Defendants' arguments to the contrary
simply attempt to divert the Court from the real issues.
Finally, many of the references to
Defendants'
were

taken

Plaintiffs'

"Statement
of

the

attorney

depositions completed.

of

reflected in

Facts1' referred to depositions which

Plaintiffs
to

the record

without

cross-examine

allowing

and

time

for

without having the

(R. 496). These partial depositions were

never published and any reference to them on the record should be
stricken
addition,

and

should

certain

not

be

supplemental

considered

by

this

Court.

In

affidavits and memorandums were

filed by the Defendants well beyond

the deadlines

for responses

of motions before the Court pursuant to rule and without leave or
approval from the lower court to file the supplemental documents.
(R. 525-551).

These

documents should also be stricken from the

7
record and not considered by this Court.
REPLY ARGUMENT
I.
As

stated

before,

mischaracterized the
case,

REPLY TO POINT I
the

issue of

(R. 117-121).

It

is

Defendants

have

rescission as
not

the

intentionally

it relates to this

principal

issue.

The

principal issue is what the Defendants did; the question of which
remedy is to be involved is premature.
Cause of

Action sought

In any

event, the First

money damages and only as an alternative

to separate the two cooperatives.

(See Verified Complaint (R. 6-

7).
The Plaintiffs do not seek a "rescission" of the combination
between CVD and IMPA,

but since

Defendants make

it the primary

object of their defense it merits some discussion.
a contractual remedy.
was

first

One cannot

a. contract.

have rescission

Plaintiffs'

action

is

Rescission is
unless there
not based on

contract but based on statutory procedures for combining
Utah agricultural cooperatives.

Plaintiffs are not acting on any

contract with Defendants in this case.
not at

The

Letter of

Intent is

issue and there is no other contract between the parties.

The only reference to rescission in
the

two (2)

Fifth

and

last

Cause' of

rescission of liens and

Plaintiffs' complaint

Action

is in

wherein Plaintiffs seek

other incumbrances

on CVD

assets which

wese granted by IMPA to unidentified third-parties withoyt proper
authority.
Nevertheless, if the

Court

chooses

to

define Plaintiffs'

8
action

as

seeking

rescission,

that

issue

goes merely to the

question of remedies available; the remedy must be fashioned only
after all

of the facts are heard by the trial court.

Affidavits

and depositions of the Plaintiffs clearly

raised disputed issues

of

of rescission would be

fact

regarding

whether

the

available and to what degree.
those disputed

facts nor

remedy

The lower court never acknowledged

did it

determine that such facts were

undisputed.
The lower court in
rescission was

its

Memorandum

Decision

held

that no

available because there Mare many other entities,

people involved, that have so changed their position and reliance
from rhe

transfer of assets that it would be inequitable for the

Court to

consider the

The lower

remedies of

rescission and restitution."

court cannot make such a finding without having a full

evidentiary hearing or without also

finding

disputed facts with respect to the finding.

that

there

are no

(R. 553). The lower

court: aid neither and the record reflects that the evidence would
not support

such a finding even had the court done so.

(R. 552-

554, 266) .
The Defendants claim in their ''Statement

of Case"

that the

disputed facts which the Plaintiffs rely on are from inadmissable
affidavits of Gordon Zilles and Lyle Tuddenham.
affidavits and

depositions show

although the Defendants attempted
Gordon Zilles
was

never

and Lyle

granted,

otherwise.
to

strike

Tuddenham, Defendants'

and

that

motion

relied

A review

of the

(R. 239-246).
the

And

affidavits of

motion to strike
heavily

on

Mr.

9
Tuddenhamfs

deposition

which

Plaintiffs had no opportunity
Mr., Daines

had

no

never

completed

to cross-examine.

and

(See

which

R. 496).

opportunity to cross-examine because of the

deposition schedule which
imposed on

was

Defendants

Plaintiffs counsel

arranged

with very

full week's block of time directly

and unilaterally

short notice, taking a

prior to

the hearing

on the

motion to depose each Plaintiff.
But the best evidence supporting Plaintiffs' contention that
there are disputed material
Intent

itself

under

facts

which

CVD

is

based

under

provided

separate

that

ownership

the

Letter of

and IMPA had been operating up

until the time of the alleged combination.
specifically

on

That Letter of Intent

the different parties would operate

of

their

respective

assets, that

employees would remain employees of the respective employers, and
that IMPA would cause
plants through

CVD to

IMPA's payment

points were reiterated in

be reimbursed
of CVD

for the

debts.

the affidavits

use of CVD

(R. 538). These

of Mr.

Zilles and Mr.

Tuddenham and in their depositions which Defendants only now seek
to introduce.

In

other

words,

the

entanglements

between the

parties resulted from the Letter of Intent, which was terminable,
by its own terms, not by the combination.
On page 22 of Defendants' response brief, they cite Peterson
v. Hoages,

239 P.

2d 180

(Utah 1951), as a Utah application of

the Restatement of Restitution, Section 65.
of

Peterson

v.

Hodges

finds

no

However,

correlation

Restatement of Restitution as Defendants attempt

a reading

between

to apply

the
it in

10
this

case.

Peterson

v.

Hodges

is

a landlord/tenant matter

involving a lease whose existence no one disputed.

In addition,

that matter involved a "mutual" rescission of the lease contract.
In this case, we

have

no

mutual

rescission

and

we

have no

contract•
The

second

case

distinguishable.
(S.D.

Ohio

nothing

to

corporations.

deals

with

with

the

element

the

legality

After citing

boldly state "that it
essential

by

the

of

book law

claim

would

the

believe

that

intermingling of assets upon
tnat

"rescission"

would

which

be

combination between the two

a

merger

Supp. 592

between

that restitution

for rescission."
to this

to

also

two

those two (2) cases, the Defendants

is horn

of 'a

406 F.

is

sale of securities and has

horn-book law, it does not apply
have

Defendants

Mclntire v. KDI Corporation,

1957),
do

cited

case.

inequitable,

cooperatives.

Even if it is
The Defendants

detrimental

Defendants

is an

reliance

rely

was

and

in arguing

a result of the

In

fact

it

was a

result of the Letter of Intent dated June 15, 1984, which clearly
by its own terms, provided for a termination and avoidance of all
of the

obligations under

the Letter

of Intent.

(See paragraph

21, Letter of Intent, R. 541).
It appears that the result Defendants are really after is to
have

this

Court

reform

the

Letter

contract for a sale of assets from CVD
that rescission
And Defendants

of the
want all

of Intent to be a binding
to IMPA

reformed contract
this even

and then declare

would be inequitable.

though the

Letter of Intent

11
clearly states that it is not a merger or sale of assets and that
it is terminable by the parties.
The next Utah case
their argument

attributable to

which Defendants

on rescission

p. 2d 1156 (Utah 1981).

financial

based

on

That case is hardly

this case.

assistance

erroneous

application for

In

in support of

close to

Toscano this

the Department

any facts

Court ordered the
of Social Services

payments which the Defendant received

information

assistance.

which

was

provided

on

his

This Court found that the Defendant

had not so changed his circumstances
State inequitable.

rely on

is Toscano v. Social Services, 624

Defendant individual to repay
for

(R. 536-592).

to make

restitution to the

In this case, Toscano can be used to support

Plaintiffs1 position

in

that

it

was

in

fact

IMPA

that was

receiving the benefits from the CVD Amalga plant and its equities
therein to allow it to obtain the claimed
credit with

the Sacramento

Bank of

$18,000,000.00 line of

Cooperatives.

Beyond that,

Toscano has no application to this case.
Defendants cite Christensen v. Abbott, 671
1983),

as

supporting

this

Court's

Christensen is another case that involves
agistor was

allowed to

caring for cattle.
all applicable

recover for

P. 2d

position

in

a contract.

121 (Utah
Toscano.
A cattle

his services in feeding and

The only part of the decision that appears at

to Toscano, let alone the case at bar, appears to

be the ruling by this Court that "as

a general

rule, an agistor

may not obtain a quantum meruit recovery for the feeding and care
of cattle if he has wrongfully retained possession of them.

The

12
buraen of

proving wrongfulness is on the party benefitted by the

agistor's services."
ruling that

if the

(citations omitted).
Plaintiffs prove

It appears

from that

the wrongfulness of IMPA's

actions with respect to the combination then Defendants would not
be entitled

to the restitution they claim Plaintiffs must tender

to qualify for rescission, according to their own argument.
It

is

the

Defendants

entanglement and

reliance and

now wish to rely on to
with respect

who

to the

created

combination.

clear requirements

since the contested one at bar.

by

mmgled beyond

division.

additional combinations

statutory requirements

their

of the law

The Defendants ask this Court to

authorizing

corporations to allow

of

It is they who have furthered

the entanglements by pushing through two

consolidation

conditions

change of circumstance which they

avoid the

encourage persons to avoid

the

boards

operations

of
and

of merger and

directors
assets

of

to

two

be co-

Is one to support that this is a "new"

form of combination; combination by irreversible commingling.
The Defendants want

to

justify

their means of acnieving them.
gaping

hole

through

the

their

end

result despite

Such a "new" policy would shoot a

legislative

controls

that

State

Government has consistently exercised over corporate power and in
protection of stockholder's interests.
Defendants
barred

by

next

their

claim

that

unreasonable

Plaintiffs

delay.

little reply since it is clear from the
shortly after

action

should be

This argument deserves
record that

it was only

the alleged transfer of assets was fully completed
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that the Plaintiffs
certainly not

filed

their

an unreasonable

action.

Six

(6) months is

delay, especially considering the

attempts that the Plaintiffs first made with other members of the
Board

of

CVD

to

try

to

resolve

the

problem of the illegal

combination before filing suit.
It was not until
August of

1986 that

title passed

on the

CVD Amalga

plant in

CVD Board members could have learned of the

potential conflict over the full extent and impact of the alleged
combination with

IMPA.

After August,

rumors began circulating

and inquiries were made to Defendant Wilson.
83).

Defendant Wilson

then responded

dated November 19, 1986
Meeting of
the

full

(R. 65-74)

December 17,
impact

Plaintiffs.

of

The

1986.

(See R.

75-77, 79-

in a letter to the Board

which led

to the

CVD Board

(R. 384). It was only then that

IMPAfs

position

Defendants

rely

became
on

known

Andrews

v.

to

the

Precision

Apparatus, Inc., 271 F. Supp 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), to suggest that
even ten (10) days would be improper and an unacceptable delay to
assert the Plaintiffs' claim.
clearly

distinguishable.

However,

There,

enjoin a merger after the merger
articles

of

allegation of
that the

an illegal

case,

again, is

the Plaintiff was seeking to

had become
That

case

consolidation.

effective by filing

did

not

involve

an

Plaintiffs here claim

combination was done outside of the legal requirements.

In addition,
never

consolidation.

that

by Defendants'

formalized

pursuant

articles of consolidation or

own admission,
to

legal

merger.

the combination was

requirements
The first

by

filing

time it became
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clear that

the Defendants were claiming that they accomplished a

transfer of assets was

after Plaintiffs'

lawsuit was

filed and

answered.
Finally,

Defendants

claim

are not available remedies
adequate

and

complete

that rescission or cancellation

where the

remedy

at

Plaintiffs have
law"

through damages.

argument is irrelevant because Plaintiffs clearly
"money damages"

is

still

the

did seek first

no

evidence

and applicable

to

support

record

will

reveal

that

in this case,

the

Plaintiffs can be fully compensated with money.
fact,

That

(See Verified Complaint at R. 6-7). If conceded

that the legal argument is correct
there

a "plain,

position
As a

that

matter of

IMPA has suffered serious

losses after its combination with CVD and continues to do so, and
there are

serious questions

as to whether IMPA would be capable

of paying damages to the Plaintiffs if they were awarded.
II.

REPLY TO POINT II

Defendants again mischaracterize
respect

to

the

issue

of

Plaintiffs'

position with

the lower court's refusal to certify

Plaintiffs as class representatives.

Plaintiffs do not challenge

the

claim

lower

court's

discretion

but

that the lower court

cannot dismiss Plaintiffs' action based on Plaintiffs' failure to
meet the

Court's requirements to be certified as representatives

of the class.
The

lower

court

specifically

found

in

its

Memorandum

Decision that the Plaintiffs "may have different interests" with
other members of the class. However, the lower court failed to
determine if the questions of law or fact were in fact common to
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the class, whether the
typical

of

the

representative

claims of the representative parties are

claims

parties

of
will

interests of the class. (See
claim

that

the

the

lower

class,

fairly
Rule

and

whether

the

and adequately protect the

23(a)

U.R.C.P.)

Plaintiffs

court should have made specific findings

with respect to why the class
to the statutory guidelines.

action was

not qualified pursuant

In addition, Plaintiffs should have

been allowed to have the class action altered or amended pursuant
to Rule

23(c)(1) to

meet the lower court's concerns rather than

dismiss the case.
within the

Just

because

proposed class

their interests

with

there

are

different classes

does not necessarily mean that all of

respect

to

the

class

action

cannot be

represented by the proposed class representatives.
Defendants rely
Anderson

which

conjunction

was

with

a

on information

in the

submitted

filed

and

Supplemental

affidavit of Leland
with

Memorandum

in

Plaintiffs' Request for Class Certification (R.
tiled after

the hearing

on all

the

such memorandum.

525).

an extraneous

combination

between

membership somehow
CVD.

Such argument

allowed for

Nonetheless, if the Court finds that

vote which
IMPA

This was

of the motions before the Court

it would be appropriate to consider the document,
rely on

in

opposition to

and which was completely beyond any time limitations
filing of

Court

and

CVD

ratified the
does not

took place
to

the Defendants

subsequent to the

suggest

that

the

CVD

illegal combination of IMPA and

follow any

logic.

First of all,

there is no basis in the law for allowing corporate membership to
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ratify illegal

acts of the corporation ex post facto.

the subsequent voting had to do
and parties.

Neither

with completely

Secondly,

separate issues

the Plaintiffs nor the Court can draw any

conclusions from the results of such a vote.
The subsequent voting referred
well

have

had

the

outcome

to

from

belief that their equity interest

by

Defendants

may very

CVD members because of their
in

CVD

may

be

furthered by

supporting a new organization in control of CVD assets other than
IMPA.

No one can predict with any certainty what the voters were

thinking.

Nevertheless Defendants conclude that the Defendants*

illegal acts

in combining

IMPA with

CVD were

ratified by that

subsequent vote

on a

subsequent merger

that involved different

entities.

then

attempt

strap

They

conclusion with

a further

to

boot

argument that Plaintiffs' allegations

are now moot because of the subsequent merger.
carries to

that unsupported

Such' a position

the ridiculous Defendants' earlier position that they

can circumvent the law Dy entangling the parties involved to such
a degree

that it becomes "impossible" to pull the entities apart

without causing inequities.

Now they

go even

further to claim

that if one can later get the membership of the entities involved
to approve a subsequent combination that is conducted pursuant to
law,

that

violators

such
from

ratifies
being

the

illegal

answerable

to

acts

and insulates the

legislative requirements.

Such an argument bears no further comment.
III.
Despite

Defendants'

REPLY TO POINT III
claims

to

the

contrary,

Utah

Code

17
Annotated

Section

requirements

for

3-1-30
an

It

seq.

agricultural

another, whether it be
of assets.

et

clearly

cooperative

called merger,

is curious

sets

that in

Defendants

cannot

produce

consolidation or transfer

all the mounds of pleading,

one

shred

of

the record,

authority

supports their alleged transfer of assets being conducted
manner that

it was.

The

transfer was

without proper notice to members of

the

to combine with

briefing and memorandum of points and authorities on
the

forth

that
in the

without Board approval,

the corporation

and despite

notice being sent to certain members that a combination was going
to be conducted pursuant

to certain

specific statutes

and then

those statutes being ignored.
Although Defendants now maintain that what they did with CVD
on December 16, 1985 was really a transfer of assets (despite the
notices to the contrary) they have never been able to explain the
IMPA Resolution adopted December 19, 1985,
the

CVD

meeting.

purports to have
therein admits
CVD membership.
a merger

(See

the

was a

IMPA

three (3) days after

Resolution, R. 326). That resolution
Board

abandon

what

Plan of Merger (consolidation) approved by

How can the CVD membership be alleged to approve

and then

IMPA unilaterally

abandon it

then appropriate all CVD assets without any further
membership

the Resolution

action?

This

unbelievable

shell, proves IMPA's ill will, bad

and on its own
CVD Board or

maneuvering,

in a nut

faith and

lack of

any legal

on

arguments in their

basis for their current position.
Plaintiffs

rely

principally

their
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initial brief

in arguing

the balance of this issue.

do note that the lower court erred in
if Section

3-1-30 et

seq. did

failing to

not apply

would apply.

It erred in

not finding

conducted or

achieved a

combination by

Plaintiffs

determine that

what other procedures

that even

had Defendants

means of

a transfer of

assets, that Defendants needed to meet the statutory requirements
required

by

a

corporate

assets out of the

transfer

ordinary

of all or substantially all

course,

to

wit:

proper

notice to

members and proper approval by a Board of Directors.
Defendants

misrepresent

respect to the exclusivity of
take the

position that

Plaintiffs'

legal

the

statute.

merger

pursuant to

surrounding this case, including

position

with

Plaintiffs

the facts and circumstances

but not

limited to

the notice

that the exclusive method for the combination of CVD and IMPA was
through that cooperative statute.
the alternative,

But Plaintiffs have always, in

argued that if a merger by way of U.C.A. 3-1-30

et seq. was not the exclusive remedy, then

the combination would

need to be conducted pursuant to general corporate law, or if not
by that, then by common

law,

and

that

the

combination failed

under any of those procedures.
Defendants claim that the Court made no finding with respect
to whether the
was done
with

transfer of

thereto

belief

assets between

CVD and IMPA

The lower courtfs failure to make a finding

properly.

respect

erroneous

alleged

that

was

apparently

Plaintiffs1

based

complaint

on

the

failed

Court's
to

seek
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monetary damages

based on

court did not need
clearly, does

an improper

to reach

seek

such

combination and that the

that issue.

remedies.

Plaintiffs' Complaint

(See

Verified Complaint,

paragraph 36-39. (R. 7).
Defendants

also

argue

agricultural cooperatives

that

Section

broad powers,

3-1-9(1)

grants

including a transfer of

aii or substantially all of the assets to the corporation outside
of

the

ordinary

course

membership approval.
first parr
the

last

of

its

business and without board or

In support of that position, they quote the

of paragraph (I) of Section 3-1-9 but fail to include
part

cooperative's

of

the

rights.

paragraph
It

which

states:

clearly

limits

a

"and [a cooperative] may

exercise all powers, rights, and privileges necessary or incident
thereto

including

the

exercise

privileges granted by the
generally, excepting

amended).

of

any

this

rights, powers

state

and

to cooperations

such as are inconsistent with the expressed

provisions of this act."
(1953 as

laws

of

Section

This language

3-1-9(1) Utah

Code Annotated

appears to clearly limit the

powers of the cooperative to powers that are generally granted to
business

corporations,

otherwise inconsistent.
may be more limiting.

and

only

then

if

such powers are not

Plaintiffs believe that

3-1-30, et seq.

But Defendants' argument goes much further

in alleging their activities are subject to no statuory controls.
Suqh a theory is nonsensical.
The

Defendants

quote

support of their position.

the

comments

of Senator Harwood in

However, the Senator's

quote on page

20
40 of Defendants' Response Brief, better supports the position of
the Plaintiffs-

The Senator says

been

the

provided

means

for

agricultural cooperatives-to

that "evidently
corporation

there has not

and

merge"• suggests

cooperatives-

that cooperatives

have not had the ability to merge or combine in the past.
they did,

the Senator

procedure of

states it

either buying

means that sometimes

was done

Or, if

through the "tedious

assets or buying stock or some other

makes

it

difficult

or

even impossible".

Clearly the Senator was not referring to the kind of "transfer of
assets" that the
certainly

Defendants

appears

from

are

the

less tedious and cumbersome

claiming

transfer of

than

remarks

assets means

could not achieve

the

this

case.

It

record that the procedure used was
even

the

that were espoused by Senator Harwood.
Detendant Wilson's own

in

that

In fact, it is clear from
the

of combination

results

merger requirements

through

Defendants

chose the

because they knew they
following

the statute.

(See R. 66, 80-81) .
In short,

Defendants reasoning

law existing prior to
would

allow

the enactment

cooperatives

to

Defendants, there would clearly
statute to
referred to

is clearly

flawed.

of Section

3-1-30, et seq.

combine through the means used by
be no

need to

"facilitate" such combinations.
the "tedious

If the

procedure" of

enact the merger

When Senator Harwood

transferring assets, he

was referring
to the common law requirement of unanimous
shareholder approval. (See R. 57). The quoting of a statement
made on the floor of the legislature by one senator hardly
constitutes legislative intent or history?
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Finally, the Defendants try to make the untenable point that
the Plaintiffs have benefited from
IMPA.

.However it

tYie combination

of

C\TD and

is very rare that one would take an action to

the State Supreme Court believing the position one is challenging
is to

one's benefit.

The

Defendants like to paint the picture

that the Plaintiffs are six "disgruntled" rebels who are the only
people

associated

with

CVD

challenge the combination.
are numerous
as

and

IMPA

However, as

the record

shows, there

other potential Plaintiffs waiting to assert claims

Plaintiffs

of

record

should

disqualification of the class action.
IV.
Rule 52(a)

such

be

necessary

(R. 269).

Utah Rules of Civil procedure requires the lower

on ail

written statement

of the

case,

tne

requirement

would require the lower
ruling on.

of

court

to

explain

which

motion

for

Summary

their

Judgment.

In

it is

It is not clear from the lower court's action whether

Judgment.

or Defendants'

If it was granting Defendants1

Motion for Summary Judgment it should specify the
found

ground.

Rule 52(a) clearly applies and

it was granting the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Motion

grounds for

motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a)(b)

and 59 when the motion is based on more than one (1)
this

by

REPLY TO POINT IV

court to at least enter a
its decision

that have any desire to

were

undisputed

If the court was

areas where it

facts to substantiate the Summary

granting the

Motion to

Dismiss, it

must likewise specify on what grounds the motion is granted.
lower court made no such

determinations

but

only

The

made certain

22
findings of

fact and

conclusions of

law which

had no specific

connection to the particular motions of the Defendants.
V.

REPLY TO ISSUE ON "FINALITY" OF MEMORANDUM DECISION

The Defendants have correctly pointed out

in their "Summary

of Argument" that the guestion of whether the memorandum decision
was Ma final order"
before this

and therefore

Court pursuant

appealable was

to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

and a second Motion to Dismiss or in
Summary Disposition

of Rescission

Court to Plaintiffs'
response

to

those

that issue again.

fully briefed

Memorandum
motions

the Alternative
Claim.

of

Motion for

Plaintiffs refer the

Points

and

Authorities in

should the Court desire to consider

It is Plaintiffs1 position that this Court has

already decided that issue twice in favor of Plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
1.

For the

reasons set forth hereinabove, it is submitted

that the trial court should be reversed and the case remanded for
the trial

court to

consider the

being restrained by the

case based

reguirements of

on the Defendants1

Section 3-1-30

et seg.

with respect to the combination of IMPA and CVD.
2.

Alternatively,

that

the

combination

of IMPA and CVD

must follow the statutory procedures of Section 3-1-30 et seg. or
the general

corporate procedures

set forth for business or non-

profit corporations by Utah Statute.
3.
common

Alternatively
law

stockholders.

that

reguirements

of

the
the

Defendants
unanimous

must

follow

consent

of

the
the
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4.
of

That there are disputed facts with respect to the issue

forms

of

relief

available

to

the

Plaintiffs,

including

rescission.
5.

That

the

lower

court

should

determine

requirements for proper certification of Plaintiffs'
class

action

are

Plaintiffs being
alterations

or

met,

and

of

of
the

the
class

class

action as a

and

action

technical deficiencies found pursuant to Rule 23(c).
DATED this %0

the

what, if any, conflicts exist with

representatives
amendments

if

June, 1988.

Attorney for Appellants
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Attorney for Appellants
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allow for
meet any
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